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homeownership and pensions in long-run
perspective
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aSchool of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; bMax
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT
The hypothesis of a trade-off between homeownership and welfare state pro-
vision, first proposed by Jim Kemeny around 1980, is a foundational claim in
the political economy of housing. However, the evidence for this hypothesis
is unclear at both macro and micro levels. This paper examines the link
between welfare and homeownership at the macro level using new long-run
data and a multilevel modelling approach. It shows that the negative cross-
sectional correlation between homeownership and public welfare provision
observed in the earliest available data disappears and becomes neutral by
the 1980s and possibly positive subsequently. Within-country trajectories
vary, but are significantly positive in more countries than significantly nega-
tive, suggesting that in some contexts welfare and homeownership are com-
plements rather than competitors. The paper posits a dual ratchet effect
mechanism in both pension benefits and homeownership capable of produc-
ing this inversion, and further suggests that rising public indebtedness and
the debt-stabilising effects of welfare states may account for the emergence
of complementarity in the pension–homeownership relationship. The latter
supports the hypothesis that some countries have avoided the trade-off by
‘buying time’ on credit markets.
KEYWORDS Homeownership; welfare; pensions; trade-off; long run
Housing has long been relatively neglected in the comparative welfare
states literature and in political economy more generally. Nevertheless,
the best-established hypothesis in this terrain is the notion of a long-run
trade-off between homeownership and social policy generosity, especially
in old-age pensions (Kemeny 1981). Castles (1998) termed this homeown-
ership–pension relationship the ‘really big trade-off’. While scholars took
up this hypothesis only sporadically for two decades, recent literature has
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seen a number of studies of the housing–social policy link (Ansell 2014;
Delfani et al. 2014; Kohl 2018a; Prasad 2012; Schwartz 2014; Schwartz
and Seabrooke 2008). Despite initial empirical support, more recent stud-
ies have failed to find evidence to support the trade-off hypothesis (e.g.
Ansell 2014; Kohl 2018a). However, a key limitation of this literature is
that it confounds cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions of this
hypothesis, which are both theoretically and empirically distinct. The goal
of this paper is to test both dimensions of the trade-off hypothesis using
the best available data and methods appropriate to the underly-
ing hypotheses.
Kemeny’s primary comparative formulation of the trade-off hypoth-
esis posited a stable negative association between homeownership and
social policy, emerging in the early twentieth century or before. One
conjecture motivating our research is that previous studies have yielded
inconsistent findings because this cross-sectional relationship existed
historically, but disappeared over time. Indeed, we show that a home-
ownership–pension trade-off existed prior to the 1990s, but has disap-
peared and even possibly turned positive since. The inversion of the
trade-off reflects a process of upwards convergence: a simultaneous
increase and decline in variance in both pension generosity and home-
ownership levels. For most countries, this contradicts the secondary, lon-
gitudinal social insurance hypothesis proposed by Castles (1998): the
argument that declining welfare provision might incentivise households
to pursue homeownership as a form of self-insurance. As we emphasise,
however, it is important to recognise the heterogeneity of country
trajectories.
This inversion of the trade-off relationship raises the question of why
the cross-sectional pattern changed over time (or, equivalently, why
within-country longitudinal trajectories vary so widely). Due to the intrin-
sic limitations of cross-national comparative research in the presence of
widely varying patterns, our answers are tentative. First, drawing on the
comparative welfare states literature, we posit a dual ratchet effect in both
pension and housing systems capable of producing upwards convergence.
We provide evidence consistent with this ratchet effect mechanism.
Second, we consider the permissive conditions that have enabled some
countries (but not others) to achieve an ‘embarrassment of riches’ (both
generous pension systems and high homeownership rates). Streeck (2014)
has recently argued that a key feature of the post-1970s political economy
is the avoidance of seemingly hard trade-offs by ‘buying time’ on credit
markets (cf. Krippner 2011). We present evidence consistent with this
‘buying time’ view: countries with higher long-run rates of inflation and
debt accumulation tended to see greater simultaneous growth in home-
ownership and pensions.
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In addition to changes in the underlying relationship between home-
ownership and social policy, a second set of reasons for the inconsistent
results found in the previous literature is methodological. First, given the
difficulty of assembling appropriate long-run datasets, studies have tended
to rely on data series beginning in the 1980s. Second, common statistical
models are more appropriate for assessing the longitudinal social insur-
ance hypothesis than the original cross-sectional hypothesis, and also
assume causal homogeneity across countries. One of the main contribu-
tions of this paper is to address these issues. First, we report findings
from two datasets: one with the earliest available data for homeownership
and pensions (from the interwar period), and another with data from the
1960s through the present, spanning more than 50 years. As we will see,
inclusion of pre-1980s data is critical to a test of the cross-sectional trade-
off hypothesis. Second, we adopt a multilevel modelling approach that
enables us to both distinguish between longitudinal and cross-sectional
effects (Bell and Jones 2015) and remain attentive to the heterogeneity of
within-country trajectories (Western 1998).
The paper is structured as follows: after a review of existing literature,
we suggest theoretical reasons for the inversion of the trade-off and
develop hypotheses about its disappearance. We then present the new
long-run data and a methodological discussion of the reasons for incon-
sistent findings, as well as presenting the motivation for our multilevel
modelling approach. The results section first documents the inversion of
the trade-off through simple descriptive analyses and then tests whether
this shift is robust in multivariate, multilevel regressions. The conclusion
summarises the findings and considers implications for the literature on
asset-based welfare.
Literature and theory
The hypothesis of a relationship between welfare states and homeowner-
ship has a long pedigree in sociology, political science and housing policy
scholarship. Writing in the early 1980s, Kemeny (1981) first argued for a
systematic trade-off between homeownership rates and a broad range of
social policies. At the core of the argument is the observation that home-
ownership ‘front-loads’ the cost of housing over the lifecycle, because
young families need to save for down payments and pay mortgages out of
early-career salaries. Kemeny reasoned that this financial burden would
tend to depress support for the taxation required to fund redistribution in
the form of generous social policies. This account viewed homeownership
as the exogenous (and presumably causal) variable: the argument was that
in countries with a pre-existing high level of homeownership (especially
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new world settler societies), welfare state generosity would remain con-
tained (Kemeny 2005: 65; Schwartz 2012: 42).
An implicit assumption of this argument is that welfare states and
homeownership levels reflect highly stable equilibria. In this sense, the
original Kemeny trade-off hypothesis is fundamentally cross-sectional.
Castles (1998) revised this hypothesis in two ways. First, he argued that
the ‘really big trade-off’ was between homeownership and pensions (rather
than welfare states as a whole). On this view, homeownership and social
insurance are functional substitutes in the provision of old-age liveli-
hoods. Second, he introduced the secondary hypothesis that because of
this equivalence, declining public pension provision could incentivise
households to seek homeownership as a form of self-insurance. This
‘social insurance’ hypothesis reverses the causality of the relationship,
with welfare state spending or benefit levels driving homeownership rates.
In contrast to the classic trade-off view, this social insurance hypothesis
was mainly longitudinal, rather than cross-sectional: the fundamental
claim was that welfare state retrenchment would trigger rising homeown-
ership rates as households sought to self-insure.1
Table A1 in the online appendix provides a list of studies which,
broadly speaking, address the trade-off hypothesis. Castles (1998) reported
negative and statistically significant correlations between homeownership
and a variety of social policy indicators for 20 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 1960 and
1990. In the first multivariate regression analysis, Conley and Gifford
(2006) presented evidence supporting the trade-off hypothesis from a pri-
marily cross-sectional standpoint. In keeping with recent statistical prac-
tice, more recent studies have employed fixed effects (and in many cases
first-differenced) estimation, making these studies implicitly tests of the
social insurance/welfare retrenchment hypothesis, rather than the classic
trade-off view. We return to this key methodological point below.
Extending the hypothesis to mortgage debt (assumed to be closely related
to homeownership), Prasad (2012) also presented supporting evidence.2
However, Ansell (2014) finds that the political and policy effect of home-
ownership is entirely dependent on housing price increases. Doling and
Horsewood (2011) also use within-country longitudinal methods and
focus on housing prices, presenting somewhat mixed evidence. Finally,
Kohl (2018a) finds a positive rather than negative, but not clearly signifi-
cant, relationship between homeownership and general state spending.
This literature is empirically inconclusive. While early studies showed a
negative and statistically significant correlation, more recent papers have
failed to find supporting evidence (Ansell 2014; Kohl 2018a). There are sev-
eral reasons for this ambiguous evidence. First, although the original hypoth-
esis posits a trade-off emerging in the first half of the twentieth century,
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studies have tended to rely (largely for reasons of data availability) on post-
1980s data. Second, largely for methodological reasons, recent multivariate
analyses have tended to implicitly shift from the original hypothesis of a sta-
ble, cross-national relationship to the secondary hypothesis (Castles 1998;
Kemeny 2005) that welfare retrenchment beginning in the 1980s incentivised
households to pursue homeownership as a form of self-insurance. We
emphasise that these hypotheses should be treated as distinct.
A third reason is that no study has systematically investigated the pos-
sibility that there was a cross-sectional trade-off, but that this trade-off
disappeared due to structural changes in housing and/or welfare regimes
(Blackwell and Kohl 2018). This possibility is suggested by Castles’ (1998)
finding of a declining cross-sectional, bivariate correlation between home-
ownership and pension spending falling from 0.68 to 0.4 between
1960 and 1990. Indeed, simple descriptive statistics suggest that the cross-
sectional association between pensions and homeownership has turned
from negative to neutral or even positive (see Figure 2). Below, we show
that this shift is robust to controlling for other variables and that the
change in cross-sectional slopes is statistically significant.
Given these patterns, we consider two descriptive hypotheses about the
processes that may be driving this inversion. These hypotheses, as well as
further arguments about explanatory mechanisms and permissive condi-
tions, are summarised in Table 1. The first is asymmetric convergence
Table 1. Hypotheses.
Name Hypothesis Type
Asymmetric convergence D pension spending/benefits is negatively
associated with D homeownership (within
countries), inducing a moderation of the
cross-sectional pension–homeownership
correlation
Descriptive
Upwards convergence D pension spending/benefits is positively
associated with D homeownership, induc-
ing a moderation or inversion of the
cross-sectional pension–homeownership
correlation.
Descriptive
Dual ratchet effect Pension spending and homeownership
exhibit downward rigidity (increases larger
and more frequent than decreases) due to
political unpopularity of benefit cuts/
increasing difficulty of homeownership
Explanatory
(mechanism)
Buying time Change in public/private debt and/or infla-
tion➔ More positive within-country pen-
sion/homeownership slope.
Explanatory
(permissive condition)
Income
Life expectancy
Larger increase in GDP per capita➔
More positive within-country pension/
homeownership slope
Larger increase in life expectancy➔ More
positive within-country pension/homeown-
ership slope
Explanatory
(alternative hypothesis)
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driven by declining pension benefits in historically high pension countries.
According to this hypothesis, exogenous changes in pension spending and
benefits reflecting welfare state retrenchment, particularly in historically
low homeownership countries, induced increases in homeownership. In
other words, high pension countries historically positioned in the ‘top left’
quadrant of the homeownership–pension space in Figures 1 and 2 moved
towards the centre. Note that this implies a negative within-country rela-
tionship between pensions and homeownership, at least in countries with
a substantial degree of retrenchment. This process is thus consistent with
the Castles secondary social insurance hypothesis, and thus with the con-
jecture of a within-country trade-off. However, an important implication
is that a substantial effect of this kind would moderate or potentially neu-
tralise Kemeny’s primary cross-sectional observation.
The second hypothesis is bi-directional upwards convergence.
According to this interpretation, both homeownership and pensions
have increased ever time, converging on levels that were considered
‘high’ in relative terms in the 1970s. Upwards convergence implies a
declining correlation for reasons contrary to the welfare retrenchment
hypothesis: as pension benefits rose among relative laggards (historically
high homeownership countries), the cross-sectional correlation declined
Figure 1. Homeownership–pension trade-off in major interwar cities.
Sources: see Online Appendix I.
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as these countries moved towards the ‘high spending, high homeowner-
ship’ quadrant. On this hypothesis, many countries have experienced a
growing ‘embarrassment of riches’ as they achieve both high levels of
homeownership and generous pensions. This hypothesis implies a posi-
tive within-country relationship between pensions and homeownership
in most cases, contradicting Castles’ social insurance hypothesis. We
show below that the evidence supports the latter, upwards convergence
hypothesis: the within-country relationship is positive in most coun-
tries, and significantly positive in more countries than signifi-
cantly negative.
From the standpoint of the welfare states literature, this is perhaps
unsurprising. This is because, despite early concerns about pension
retrenchment, there has in fact been little decline in pension spending
and benefits in most countries. Pierson (2011: figure 4) shows that pen-
sion benefits (measured by replacement rates) rose between the 1970s and
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Figure 2. Inversion of the pension–homeownership trade-off.
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1990 as liberal, social democratic and late-developing Southern European
countries ‘caught up’ with the high benefits of conservative regimes.
Huber and Stephens (2001) posit a ratchet effect mechanism to account
for this pattern: social policies are resistant to downward adjustments
because of the political difficulty of reducing benefits.3 Table 3 describes
significant convergence regressions for the replacement rate and pension
spending: countries with initially low pension provision had higher aver-
age growth rates over the later decades. Thus, upward adjustments tend
to accumulate over time and not be offset by corresponding down-
ward pressures.
We address two explanatory questions about this process of upward
convergence: first, what are the mechanisms underlying the process;
second, what are the permissive conditions that enabled it to take place?
Regarding the first question, we extend Huber and Stephens’ analysis of
welfare policy ratchet effects to housing, suggesting that a dual ratchet
effect in both realms could account for upward convergence. Regarding
the second, we draw on a recent body of work arguing that a key feature
of the post-1970s political economy is the existence of political efforts to
avoid apparently binding trade-offs (Krippner 2011; Streeck 2014), espe-
cially through credit markets. In both cases, we emphasise that our goal is
to suggest theoretical mechanisms and conditions capable of producing
the patterns we observe in the data. Below we present evidence consistent
with these hypotheses, but we emphasise that data limitations inherent in
cross-national research on a small group of countries rule out the possi-
bility of definitive tests.
Explanatory mechanisms: a dual ratchet effect
While early theorists treated the trade-off argument almost as an account-
ing law – more money for tax-financed social policy, less for mortgage
payments – on further reflection it is clear that any trade-off is condi-
tional on other factors. For example, given that all households consume
housing in some form, the choice between homeownership and renting
depends on their relative cost. For a given level of taxation, a shift in
housing prices or the price/rent ratio may therefore affect the homeown-
ership rate. There are also numerous influences on welfare state develop-
ment other than homeownership. Castles and Ferrera (1996) recognised
this conditional character of the trade-off argument in their discussion of
the apparent Southern European ‘exception’ combining high homeowner-
ship and relatively generous social policy.4 They argued that this apparent
exception is possible in part due to deficit spending. We return to this
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point below, showing that this is not an ‘exception’, but a general pattern
not limited to Southern Europe.
Huber and Stephens (2001, cf. Pierson 2011) argue that because of the
political costs of withdrawing benefits, social policies are resistant to
downwards adjustments. We suggest that homeownership is subject to
similar effects: homeownership is politically popular and constraints on
home purchase politically costly. For example, homeownership subsidies
(such as mortgage interest tax deductions) are the largest part of the
‘hidden welfare state’ (Howard 1997), which is resistant to retrenchment
(Pollard 2011). Moreover, with almost all countries turning into
‘property-owning democracies’, centre-right and centre-left parties com-
pete to represent home-owning constituencies (Schelkle 2012). A study of
housing policies in party manifestos in 19 OECD countries since 1945
shows that support for homeownership increased across parties through
the 1990s (Kohl 2018b). The dual ratchet effect mechanism implies that
other factors bundled into the implicit ‘ceteris paribus’ claim underpin-
ning the trade-off hypothesis have tended to push both variables up with-
out triggering declines in the other. The political unpopularity of
decreases in either public pensions or homeownership means that causal
forces pushing in this direction are weaker than those driving increases.
Thus, in keeping with Kemeny’s original hypothesis, we suggest that in
the early stage of welfare state formation, high homeownership rates were
an effective political barrier to the taxes required to finance social policy
expansion. However, because homeownership is not the only influence on
welfare state development – after all, housing figures little in the broader
literature on welfare state formation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and
Stephens 2001) – over time, these countries did develop and then expand
welfare states. The ratchet effect implies that these increases in social pol-
icy generosity did not cause substantial declines in homeownership,
because of the inherent downwards rigidity of the latter.
Conversely, in the first half of the twentieth century, political demand
for public pension policies was strongest (and opposition to taxation weak-
est) in low homeownership countries. Subsequent to this welfare state
expansion, many of these countries saw increases in homeownership rates.
This occurred in part because political elites in these countries saw promot-
ing homeownership as consistent with their goals of establishing robust
welfare states. Promoting homeownership, as has been widely observed, is
also social policy (Prasad 2012; Schelkle 2012). In the Nordic countries, for
example, long-standing policies favour ownership in housing cooperatives,
consistent with the social democratic orientation of these welfare regimes
(Stamsø and Tranøy 2019). Similarly, Southern European countries have
engaged in a variety of policies to promote homeownership, while also
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developing generous (albeit segmented) welfare states (Castles and Ferrera
1996). According to the classic trade-off view, these increases in homeown-
ership rates should have depressed support for the welfare state, especially
pensions. However, the social policy ratchet effect implies that whatever the
impact on the political preferences of marginal homeowners, rising home-
ownership has little aggregate effect on social policy.
Permissive conditions: ‘buying time’
The homeownership–pension ratchet effect provides a theoretically con-
sistent analysis of the mechanism producing an inversion of the trade-off.
However, it does not account for the structural conditions which make it
possible for countries to sustain an ‘embarrassment of riches’ (i.e. a com-
bination of a high homeownership rate and generous pensions). That is,
if the trade-off first observed by Kemeny was a binding constraint in the
early twentieth century, why has it not been more recently?
A recent strand of literature suggests that the post-1970s political econ-
omy is characterised by policies that avoid allocative trade-offs by ‘buying
time’ on credit markets. Streeck (2014) argues that, in the face of declin-
ing state revenue, governments resorted first to inflation (in the 1970s),
then public debt (in the 1980s and 1990s) and then private debt (in the
2000s) in order to avoid cuts to public spending. Similarly, Krippner
(2011) argues that the post-1970s expansion of credit in the US emerged
as the unintended consequences of a turn towards credit markets to make
tough choices about allocating capital. In this vein, we suggest that the
trade-off lost its ‘bite’ because political elites have avoided passing the
costs of social policy directly on to homeowners. The upshot of the
‘buying time’ argument is that countries can avoid the trade-off because
private and public debt (as well as inflation) defer the costs of homeown-
ership, pensions, or both. The buying time hypothesis thus implies that
countries that experienced higher long-run inflation and/or growth in public
and private debt saw greater joint growth in homeownership and pen-
sion generosity.
Several channels enable households and governments to defer costs
and thus escape the trade-off logic. Inflation can shift the mortgage bur-
den from borrowers to creditors (in some contexts) and create ‘money
illusion’ giving a temporary boost to spending (Streeck 2014).
Developments in mortgage markets, in particularly the lengthening
maturities of mortgages (e.g. the increasing availability of long-term mort-
gages) allowing households to extend the repayment process (Van Gunten
and Navot 2018) can make debt burdens more manageable under some
conditions.5 Although mortgage market development has not always
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favoured rising homeownership (Kohl 2018a), the 1960s and 1970s (the
period of late welfare expansion and rising homeownership) seem to be
the main time when it did. Larger and longer mortgages permit higher
loan-to-value ratios, thereby lessening the down-payment constraint. Both
exogenous factors thus began to disable the ‘front-loading’ micro-mechan-
ism behind the trade-off by making homeownership more accessible and
by stretching its costs over time.
Public debt, in turn, works in a similar way on the pension side of the
trade-off by shifting the possibilities of what governments can simultan-
eously afford. This is most obvious in countries with pay-as-you-go pen-
sion plans and where pensions are closely tied to the overall tax-financed
budgets, such as in Scandinavian countries. But even in countries where
contributory pensions have their own budget, increasing life expectancy
makes general budget supplements necessary. Moreover, the pension costs
of government employees – which make up more than 15% of OECD
countries’ labour force and between 17% (in France and Germany) and
27% (Austria) of pension expenditure (Ponds et al. 2011) – have been
steadily rising as an often implicit liability. As tax income failed to keep
pace with rising social spending since the 1980s (possibly due to conser-
vative tax revolt) (Streeck 2014), only large increases in public debt could
impede a pension retrenchment.
A key factor in the availability of credit for pensions and homeowner-
ship is the so-called global savings glut. Since the 1970s, the international
deregulation of financial markets, growth in private pension fund assets
due to the privatisation of pensions and rising life expectancy led to an
abundance rather than a scarcity of capital (von Weizs€acker 2016). This is
visible in the generally declining trend of global interest rates, the import-
ance of asset management firms and the rising ratios of most financial
indicators to underlying economic activity (Yi and Zhang 2017). This cap-
ital supply hypothesis complements the buying time hypothesis and
implies that countries with a greater capital supply (as reflected in the
savings rate) are more likely able to afford both high pensions and home-
ownership levels.6 To the extent that the widespread availability of capital
allows countries to fund pensions and homeownership, we expect these
countries to exhibit a weaker trade-off, or indeed a complementarity.
In addition to these political economy-based hypotheses, we also con-
sider two simple explanations for the disappearance and apparent inver-
sion of the trade-off. First, rising levels of homeownership and pension
generosity may simply reflect an increase in aggregate national income.
According to this hypothesis, rising incomes weaken the trade-off because
households have more ability to pay both taxes and mortgages. This
income growth hypothesis thus states: countries that experienced faster
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growth incomes experienced a stronger positive association between home-
ownership and pensions. Second, increasing life expectancy could cause
mechanical increases in homeownership (as population ageing implies
that homeowners account for a greater share of the population) and pen-
sion spending. This life expectancy hypothesis implies that countries that
saw greater increases in life expectancy (i.e. longer retirement duration)
saw greater positive associations between homeownership and pensions.
To summarise, we argue that the existence of a trade-off between
homeownership and pension spending is conditional on a number of dif-
ferent factors. Among these is the extent to which households are actually
pinched by social security taxes that (at the margin) prevent them from
achieving homeownership. In many cases, the rate of increase in taxes has
lagged that of pension benefits and expenditure, while debt increases have
also accompanied welfare state expansion. We return to these issues in
the discussion section below.
Data and methods
As we argued above, the literature to date has produced inconsistent evi-
dence of a homeownership–pension trade-off. Data limitations are a first
reason. Most previous research on the welfare state–homeownership
trade-off uses OECD social spending data or some narrower spending
component, particularly pension spending. These data in panel form are
conveniently available only from 1980, which partially explains the sample
period used in many previous studies. The (recent) historical period used
in previous studies is important because, as we show, the trade-off had
largely disappeared by the 1980s. Since we seek to explore both the pri-
mary long-run, cross-sectional trade-off argument and the secondary lon-
gitudinal hypothesis, we seek to use the longest possible panel and a
variety of social policy indicators.
We do so in several ways. First, we primarily use a direct policy (as
opposed to spending) indicator, the average pension replacement rate
computed from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs
and Allan 2006), which is available from 1970. There are two main rea-
sons to consider policy as well as spending indicators of social policy.
First, replacement rates are a direct measure of the benefits actually
received by households, while social spending data reflect demographic
patterns (such as population ageing) and other structural needs (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Scruggs and Allan 2006) as well as welfare policies.
Second, as far as we are aware, no previous trade-off studies have used
policy rather than spending indicators. Thus, one of our main
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contributions is to test the trade-off hypothesis using direct policy indica-
tors for the first time.
Second, we also construct a panel of pension spending as a percentage
of GDP going back to 1960 using data provided by the OECD (1985).
While there are well-known issues of comparability (Kangas and Palme
2013), we apply a statistical adjustment to reconcile pre- and post-1980
data.7 We also gathered national homeownership rates going back to the
1950s, interpolating the country trend where necessary (Kohl 2017:
20–21). The panel includes controls taken from the Penn World Tables,
World Bank and Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2018;
Feenstra et al. 2015). We adopt the same set of controls as Ansell (2014),
with the addition of life expectancy.8
Third, we also collected cross-sectional data for the interwar years in the
form of urban homeownership rates (by city) for most of the OECD coun-
tries (see sources in Online Appendix I), as well as social spending and pol-
icy data from the International Labour Organization (ILO)9 and the Social
Insurance Entitlements Dataset (SIED) database for the 1930s (SIED 2015).
As far as we know, these are the earliest available relevant data.
A second reason for inconsistent findings is methodological. While the
earliest studies (Castles 1998; Kemeny 1981) focused on cross-sectional
correlations, more recent and sophisticated studies (Ansell 2014; Kohl
2018a; Prasad 2012) employ fixed effects estimation and other common
methodological practices (Beck and Katz 1995). There are two problems
with this approach in this context. First, a country fixed effects approach
does not test the classic trade-off argument, namely a stable negative
cross-sectional correlation. If this hypothesis is true, we should not expect
fixed effects estimation to confirm it.
Second, attention to statistical issues such as omitted variable bias
should not distract from simple descriptive patterns clearly visible in the
data. Our preliminary descriptive analysis showed clear evidence of het-
erogeneity in both cross-sectional and within-country associations. Given
this descriptive pattern, we focus on identifying the country-specific tra-
jectories that result in the inversion of the cross-sectional association
from negative to positive. To do so, we employ multilevel estimation with
country-varying coefficients that capture within-country paths as well as
time-varying slopes that capture the changing cross-sectional pattern.
Allowing for country- and decade-specific slopes allows for heterogeneity
in the underlying processes generating cross-national associations
(Western 1998).
A key issue in such models is the potential correlation of group-level
coefficients (in this context, varying country intercepts) with predictor
variables. However, this issue can be addressed by including the country-
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specific mean of each independent variable as an additional predictor
(Bafumi and Gelman 2006; Bell and Jones 2015). Simulations show that
this method performs at least as well as fixed effects estimation. In this
paper, we follow Bell and Jones (2015) in additionally expressing each
predictor as a difference from this country mean. This has the advantage
of allowing an interpretation of the difference and country-mean terms as
the within-country and between-country effects, respectively.
Whereas commonly reported fixed effects estimates assume causal
homogeneity, providing one parameter estimate that pools data across
countries, our multilevel analysis provides evidence of substantial hetero-
geneity in within-country parameters. Ideally, one might take the next
step and formally account for this heterogeneity using country-level pre-
dictors of these slopes. Unfortunately, the number of cases (around 20) in
comparative OECD country-level data is simply too limited to allow for
formal test of this kind. Thus, we examine this variation descriptively,
presenting evidence consistent with the ‘buying time’ hypothesis, but do
not claim to provide a definitive test.
The trade-off in the long run: descriptive findings
Given that modern welfare states emerged between the late nineteenth
century and the immediate post-war period, the ideal time period for
identifying any trade-off is roughly the first half of the twentieth century.
Before 1950, most countries did not report national homeownership rates.
We therefore collected urban homeownership rates in countries’ major
cities for benchmark years between 1910 and 1950 and took the average
of available data. To measure welfare state provision at this time, we use
the ILO’s data on social expenditure as a percentage of GDP reported for
1933, the pension coverage and the replacement rate in the 1930s (from
SIED), and the year of introduction of a country’s pension system
(Schmitt et al. 2015). These measures capture different aspects of welfare
provision and do not always correlate highly between each other. They
are, however, negatively correlated with the averages of cities’ homeown-
ership rates (expectedly positive in the case of the timing of pension
introduction) at below 0.001 significance (see Figure 1). While cities tend
to display certain national profiles, they also display considerable within-
country variance, which is of course not accounted for by the national
welfare variable.
Castles (1998) also presented a version of the trade-off argument sug-
gesting that extensive rural farm ownership rather than urban homeown-
ership rates which pre-empted the need for a generous public pension
system. We therefore examined the association between the percentage of
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family-owned farms in 1928 (or, alternatively, 1898) with the four welfare
variables used above, using Vanhanen’s (2007) family farm share, ILO
social expenditure and the pension entitlement data, respectively. There is
a significant negative correlation between countries’ farm ownership share
and its pension coverage rate as well as a positive one with the pension
reform introduction years, while the correlations with either the replace-
ment rate or the ILO social expenditure measure are insignificant. Thus,
the evidence does not strongly support the rural ownership hypothesis in
early data. There is, however, moderate to strong evidence of a trade-off
between urban homeownership and social policy in the interwar period.
Moving forward to the 1970s, Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between homeownership and pension generosity, measured by average
replacement rates, with independent cross-sectional slopes. The figure
shows that the negative cross-sectional association observed by Kemeny
holds in the 1970s, but as early as the 1980s this slope turned neutral and
then positive in subsequent decades. We see similar patterns in scatter-
plots (see Figure A1 in the online appendix) using the synthetic pension
generosity index proposed by Scruggs and Allan (2006). Data on pension
spending also suggest a trade-off in the 1960s and 1970s which has
become neutral in more recent decades, though (in contrast to policy
measures), there is little evidence that the trade-off became a complemen-
tarity in the most recent data.
Thus, descriptive exploration of the available data provides support for
the trade-off hypothesis, in its original cross-sectional formulation, in
observations between the 1930s and 1970s. However, high-quality recent
data clearly show a moderation (for spending measures) or inversion (for
policy measures) of this relationship, such that by the 1980s or 1990s the
relationship between homeownership and pension generosity is neutral or
even positive. This is important for studies that attempt to test the trade-
off hypothesis in a multivariate setting using annual datasets, which typic-
ally include only post-1980s data. Given that the cross-sectional relation-
ship manifestly turned positive after the 1980s, there is little sense in
testing the hypothesis of a uniform negative relationship. That is, we
must take seriously this descriptive evidence of parameter heterogeneity.
Moreover, an empirical corollary of the inversion plotted in Figure 2 is
that the within-country relationship between homeownership and pen-
sions is on average positive, rather than negative. This can be clearly seen
in a scatterplot (not shown) of the data summarised in Figure 2, but fit-
ting a country-specific (rather than decade-specific) slope. With a couple
of exceptions, homeownership and pension replacement rates have risen
in tandem since the 1960s. This can be attributed in large part to com-
mon trending: in most countries, the long-term trajectory of both
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variables is upwards. However, given the wide range of trajectories, we
turn to multilevel modelling below to examine the range of longitudinal
relationships.
Multivariate analysis
The standard approach to our time-series, cross-sectional data is to esti-
mate linear panel models with country fixed effects to account for unob-
served heterogeneity. Such an analysis is inconclusive (see Table A2 in
the online appendix). Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) panel models
show a positive and statistically significant effect between homeownership
and pension (apparently contradicting the trade-off hypothesis), but this
effect is negative but statistically insignificant (for pension spending) in a
fixed effects model, and positive and insignificant in lagged dependent
variable estimates and models with time fixed effects. For replacement
rates, the association is positive and insignificant in all models. Clustering
standard errors at the country level, as is standard practice, also empha-
sises the substantial uncertainty of these estimates.10
One could conclude from this analysis that there is no robust relation-
ship between homeownership and pensions, or that the data are simply
insufficient to provide any definitive answer. We think such a conclusion
is premature for one basic reason: fixed effects estimates ignore the par-
ameter heterogeneity readily apparent in Figure 2. Multilevel models pro-
vide a natural approach to modelling such heterogeneity (Western 1998).
We estimate multilevel models of both pension replacement rates and
spending, with separate random-slope models for decade and country. As
discussed above, our estimation approach follows the proposal of Bell and
Jones (2015). For reasons of parsimony, we report here results from anal-
yses of pension replacement rates, and discuss differences with pension
spending where relevant. These models allow us to compute decade- and
country-specific slopes, summarising the heterogeneity in both cross-sec-
tional and within-country relationships.11
As shown in Table 2, in models with random decade and country
slopes, the average cross-sectional (between-country) relationship
between homeownership and pension replacement rate is indistinguish-
able from zero. This result is comparable to the OLS results just dis-
cussed. However, this average conceals the shifting cross-sectional
relationship depicted in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the changing cross-sec-
tional relationship between homeownership and pension replacement
rates via the random decade slopes taken from three models. In addition
to the ‘base controls’ model (column 1 in Table 2) and an extended
model including public and private debt, we also report random slopes
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Table 2. Multilevel models of average pension replacement rate, 1970–2013.
Decade Decade Country Country
Within-country (longitudinal) effects
Homeownership 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
(Log) GDP p.c. 0.040 0.039 0.043 0.011
(0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030)
GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) population 0.095 0.119 0.294 0.291
(0.066) (0.066) (0.108) (0.111)
Pop. > 65 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Life expectancy 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.016
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Inflation 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interest rate 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Public debt/GDP 0.094 0.130
(0.017) (0.019)
Mortgage debt/GDP 0.093 0.099
(0.023) (0.026)
Between-country (cross-sectional) effects
Homeownership 0.005 0.0001 0.005 0.0002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
(Log) GDP p.c. 0.691 0.492 0.875 0.386
(0.280) (0.473) (0.233) (0.488)
GDP growth 0.198 0.171 0.209 0.276
(0.053) (0.125) (0.044) (0.132)
(Log) population 0.016 0.048 0.196 0.128
(0.082) (0.089) (0.117) (0.130)
Pop. > 65 0.001 0.002 0.00001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Life expectancy 0.073 0.108 0.093 0.115
(0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028)
Inflation 0.084 0.052 0.135 0.096
(0.046) (0.035) (0.040) (0.037)
Interest rate 0.017 0.028 0.031 0.054
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Unemployment rate 0.013 0.023 0.010 0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Public debt/GDP 0.108 0.049
(0.107) (0.110)
Mortgage debt/GDP 0.305 0.506
(0.365) (0.374)
Constant 1.664 3.222 2.755 3.762
2.457 4.596 2.042 4.794
Observations 696 582 696 582
Log likelikood 1029.786 861.177 1061.317 876.256
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2011.572 1666.354 2074.633 1696.512
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1902.484 1544.093 1965.545 1574.251
Note: p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
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from a bivariate model as a baseline. Note that debt data are not avail-
able for some countries. These models support the hypothesis of a nega-
tive cross-sectional relationship in the earliest data; this relationship was
insignificant by the 1980s and turned positive in the latest available data
(though it should be noted that a full decade since 2010 is not yet avail-
able). This pattern is robust to the variables included in our full model
and to controls for debt. Similar results are shown by an OLS regression
(with year, but not country fixed effects to capture the cross-sectional
relationship) which interacts homeownership with a dummy variable for
each decade.
A similar analysis (see Table A4 and Figure A2 in the online appendix)
of our long series on pension spending (1960–2013) instead of replace-
ment rates yields similar conclusions, with a few provisos. The average
cross-sectional relationship between homeownership and pension spend-
ing is essentially null. However, this average again conceals substantial
variation; multilevel estimates imply that the relationship was negative
and mostly statistically significant12 through the 1980s, turning neutral
thereafter. However, it is less clear that the relationship between pension
spending and homeownership has turned positive. This conclusion is sup-
ported by multilevel estimates but not by the simple descriptive data,
which support a negative-to-null shift, but not a positive coefficient in
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Figure 3. Random decade slopes from multilevel estimates.
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more recent years. Thus, results for pension spending strongly support
the disappearance of the trade-off, but not necessarily a shift towards
complementarity.
We turn now to accounting for the logical corollary of this cross-
sectional inversion: the longitudinal country trajectories that produced
it. The upwards convergence hypothesis implies that some countries
have moved towards the top-right quadrant of Figure 2. This in turn
implies that these countries experienced increases in both variables
(above the average trend), entailing a positive slope in the country-spe-
cific varying slope models. Table 2 shows that, in models allowing for
decade-varying slopes as just discussed, the average within-country
(longitudinal) relationship between homeownership and pension
replacement rates is positive (and strongly statistically significant).
However, this interpretation is undermined for models that allow for
country-specific slopes: accounting for the variability of country trajec-
tories, the average relationship is much closer to zero. The conclusion
here is similar to the results from fixed effects models: the relationship
appears positive but imprecisely estimated.
As before, however, we are most interested in the variability of within-
country coefficients, rather than the average relationship. Figure 4 shows
the country-specific slopes for models of average pension replacement
rates. As before, we report results from three different models (including
those summarised in columns 3 and 4 in Table 2). Country trajectories
display a wide variability centred on zero, with more countries displaying
a positive than a negative association with homeownership. Taking the
base control model as a benchmark, nine countries experienced home-
ownership–pension complementarity, three experienced a trade-off, and
five experienced no discernible correlation.
Focusing on our ‘base’ model, countries that experienced significant,
positive, above-trend growth of both homeownership and pension
replacement rates fall into two primary groups: predominantly Catholic
countries in South-Western Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal and to a lesser
extent France and Belgium), the UK and some Commonwealth countries
(including Canada and New Zealand, both not Australia) and, more
ambiguously, the US. In addition, Norway falls into this category as a
clear outlier relative to the rest of Scandinavia. Meanwhile, only three
countries saw an inverse relationship between homeownership and
replacement rates (consistent with the ‘welfare retrenchment’ hypothesis):
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Results for pension spending
reported in the appendix yield similar results, with a few exceptions.13
On balance these results support the upwards convergence hypothesis
rather than welfare retrenchment-induced asymmetric convergence.
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Countries that have shifted towards the high-homeownership, high-pen-
sion quadrant generally saw substantial increases in pension replacement
rates between the 1970s and 1990s, and moderate to no retrenchment
thereafter. Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands all had above-aver-
age replacement rates in the mid-1970s and saw fairly substantial declines
by the 2000s. As Figure 4 suggests, these are the only three countries
where a negative and statistically significant negative relationship (pre-
dicted by the social insurance hypothesis) appears. In contrast, countries
like Spain, France and the UK had average or below-average replacement
rates in the mid-1970s, substantial increases through the 1990s and lim-
ited if any retrenchment thereafter. Spain in particular stands out as the
only country, as of 2000, with an average replacement rate in excess of
90% (a level only briefly reached in European history by Sweden in the
early 1980s). These countries also experienced higher than average growth
in homeownership rates.
Above, we proposed that a dual ratchet effect mechanism could
account for this upward convergence. According to this hypothesis, both
pension generosity and homeownership are resistant to downward adjust-
ments; thus, upward shifts tend to accumulate over time, leading to an
overall upwards drift. In order to assess this dual ratchet effect hypothesis,
we follow convergence analysis in growth economics (Young et al. 2008)
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Figure 4. Random country slopes from multilevel estimates.
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and regress average annual growth rates in homeownership, pension
spending and pension replacement rates on their respective initial (log)
values of these variables (measured in 1963, 1960 and 1971, respectively).
This so-called beta-convergence method is typically used to account for
catch-up processes which are implied by convergence hypotheses.
Consistent with the dual ratchet effect hypothesis, we report negative and
statistically significant associations between initial values and later growth
rates (see Table 3). In other words, countries with higher initial home-
ownership and pension generosity experienced less subsequent growth,
and vice versa. The standard deviation of OECD homeownership rates
(or sigma convergence) also falls over time. Thus, the evidence is gener-
ally consistent with the ratchet effect mechanism.
The inversion of the cross-sectional relationship between homeowner-
ship and pension generosity occurred because countries in Catholic
South-Western Europe, the UK and the Commonwealth, and a few others
were able to defy the ‘really big trade-off’, providing households with
both relatively generous public pensions and the widespread availability
of homeownership. The question is therefore how these countries were
able to escape the trade-off, and more generally why some countries show
a negative association and others a positive one.
We suggested above that public and private debt provide a means of
escaping the trade-off bind, because public borrowing disables the tax
mechanism at the heart of the hypothesis. For this reason, we add debt
measures as predictors in our models in Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4.
Public debt has a significant, positive within-country association with
pension replacement rates and spending, though there is no evidence of a
between-country relationship. In other words, growing debt likely
accounts for part of the growth in pensions in the post-1970s period,
although historically speaking more generous welfare states have not been
Table 3. Convergence regressions for homeownership (1963–2010), replacement
rates (1975–2010) and pension spending (1960–2010).
Dependent variable:
Annual
homeownership growth
Annual replacement
rate growth
Annual pension
spending growth
(1) (2) (3)
Initial homeownership 0.010 (0.003)
Initial replacement rate 0.014 (0.005)
Initial pension spending 0.014 (0.003)
Constant 0.045 (0.010) 0.003 (0.004) 0.034 (0.004)
Observations 19 17 17
R2 0.474 0.313 0.587
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.267 0.559
Residual std. error 0.003 (df ¼ 17) 0.005 (df ¼ 15) 0.007 (df ¼ 15)
F statistic 15.340 (df ¼ 1; 17) 6.833 (df ¼ 1; 15) 21.291 (df ¼ 1; 15)
Note: p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
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higher-debt states. Mortgage debt has a negative relationship with pension
replacement rates but a positive (though not fully robust) relationship
with pension spending. We defer closer study of this anomalous relation-
ship for further research.14
Controlling for debt measures also seems to moderate the trade-off
relationship somewhat; in general, country-specific coefficients in models
including debt are smaller, though somewhat marginally so. This rela-
tively limited moderating effect may reflect limitations of our modelling
approach given the extremely long-run character of the processes
involved. In the following discussion section, we return to the role of
debt, with some suggestions for further research.
Country trajectories: buying time?
Figure 4 shows that countries followed a wide variety of trajectories
through the homeownership–pension space, with more countries exhibit-
ing an apparent complementarity than a trade-off. Empirically, we would
ideally like to account for this variation in country-specific slopes.
However, it is critical to recognise the limitations of cross-national data:
ultimately, we have fewer than 20 coefficients to be explained. Thus, we
focus on establishing which hypotheses are consistent with the data, rec-
ognising the difficulty of providing definitive evidence.
The buying time hypothesis introduced above implies that countries
experiencing greater long-term increases in inflation and debt (both pub-
lic and private) are more likely to see an ‘embarrassment of riches’ (both
high pensions and homeownership). The associated variables – inflation,
mortgage debt and public debt – are included in our models. However,
the buying time hypothesis does not imply that these variables have an
immediate impact (or even an impact with a short lag). Rather, the
hypothesis suggests a very long-run relationship between changes in infla-
tion and debt and the country-specific relations between homeownership
and pensions. While we have already seen that debt has a modest media-
ting effect on this relationship (see Figure 4), these models do not capture
the influence of long-run trends and changes. Such effects are much more
difficult to model.
In order to assess these long-term relationships more informally, we
plot long-run changes (c. 1960/1970 through to c. 2015) in public and
private debt, inflation and other variables against the within-country
slopes reported in Figure 4. A series of these plots is provided in Figure
A3 in the online appendix. In the appendix figures, there is some indica-
tion of a linear association between debt measures and inflation and
country slopes. This association becomes clearer in Figure 5, which
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combines public and private debt; as this figure shows, countries experi-
encing greater debt growth since 1970 show a stronger positive within-
country association between homeownership and pensions.15 The fact
that this relationship emerges more strongly after pooling public and pri-
vate debt suggests that these forms of credit may be substitutes: in some
countries debt growth occurs in the public sector, in others among private
actors. For example, Germany saw a large long-run increase in public
debt but a relatively small increase in private debt. Conversely, Sweden
saw a comparatively small increase in mortgage debt but a larger increase
in public debt. Pooling these forms of debt produces the strong linear
association with country slopes depicted in Figure 5, which supports the
buying time hypothesis.
In addition, Figure A3 in the online appendix shows a fairly strong linear
association in long-run inflation with country slopes, also suggested by the
buying time hypothesis. This relationship is clearest for the Southern
European countries, which also stand out in Figure 5. For both debt and infla-
tion, however, France, Norway and the United Kingdom are also consistent
with this pattern. In contrast, the pattern for national savings is unexpectedly
negative, inconsistent with the capital supply hypothesis. This reflects the fact
that most countries have seen negative growth in savings relative to income
over the past several decades. In this sense, this relationship is a mirror image
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of the debt findings just discussed. It does suggest, however, that the domestic
capital supply is not the driving factor in the inversion of the trade-off.
Finally, Figure A3 in the online appendix does not suggest any linear associ-
ation between country slopes and long-run changes in national income or life
expectancy. While admittedly descriptive, this analysis thus supports the buy-
ing time hypothesis over any alternative we have considered.
It is instructive to consider this evidence in light of the observations of
Castles and Ferrera (1996). Drawing on data from the 1980s and early
1990s, they noted that four countries had both higher than average pen-
sions and homeownership: Greece, Italy, France and the United Kingdom
(Spain was a marginal case). Examination of Figures 3 and 5 shows that
this claim turns out to have been prescient: not only the Southern Europe
‘exceptions’ but also the UK, US, several Commonwealth countries and
France have been moving towards the top-right corner of homeowner-
ship–pension space. These trajectories correlate highly with the combined
increase in public and private debt in these countries. Thus, the pattern
observed by Castles and Ferrera does not appear at all exceptional, but
rather to represent one end of the new homeownership–pension con-
tinuum. While we cannot provide definitive evidence that debt is the key
driver of this shift, this relationship stands in need of further research.
Conclusion
The central claim of this paper is that the homeownership–welfare trade-
off once was, but is no more. It belonged to a particular historical period
of hard constraints, but has faded and even turned into an
‘embarrassment of riches’ in many countries since the 1980s. This is par-
ticularly visible in direct pension policy measures, such as replacement
rates, rather than broad expenditure variables. The most extensive long-
run data available and multiple methodologies support this claim.
Theoretically, we propose three complementary hypotheses to account
for this inversion. First, we distinguish between asymmetric and upwards
convergence hypotheses regarding the country trajectories driving change
in the cross-sectional pattern. We have shown that the evidence supports
the latter: simultaneous increase in both homeownership and pensions in
most countries. Second, we suggest a mechanism capable of producing
this upward convergence: dual ratchet effects operating through the polit-
ical resilience of pensions and politics of hidden welfare in homeowner-
ship. Finally, we note that trade-offs of whatever sort – between military
spending and education, welfare and homeownership or equity and effi-
ciency – are supported by particular historical conditions and constella-
tions which produce real or only perceived scarcity and exclusive
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alternatives. Once the historical background conditions change, the con-
tingent trade-offs can disappear and even turn into complementary rela-
tionships. In keeping with this view, drawing on the ‘buying time’
argument of Streeck (2014), we suggest that the ‘embarrassment of riches’
emerging in high-pension home-owning societies has been made possible
by reliance on credit markets. In other words, changes in credit markets
were the background conditions that ‘disarmed’ the trade-off. These
changes, which set in beginning in the 1980s and varied substantially
across countries, helped to offset the scarcity generating the trade-off.
Our evidence is consistent with this ‘buying time’ hypothesis, insofar as
higher levels of inflation and public and private indebtedness are associ-
ated with stronger complementarity between homeownership
and pensions.
We conclude by noting the implications of our findings for the litera-
ture on asset-based welfare (Doling and Ronald 2010). According to this
idea, states have shifted from active provision of social policy benefits to
more passive efforts to promote homeownership and housing prices as a
means of sustaining old-age livelihoods. Empirically, this view suggests
that traditional welfare is becoming more and more obsolete in light of
the generally increasing homeownership trends. However, our results sug-
gest that, in the long-run perspective and given necessary background
conditions, there is little evidence of a shift in this direction. Rather, there
is some evidence of a tendency for high-homeownership countries to also
become high-welfare provision countries, and vice versa. Whether this
trend is sustainable is another question. The implication of the ‘buying
time’ view is that the costs of homeownership and pensions have been
postponed, not avoided altogether. In the even longer run, if the trade-off
logic is ultimately correct, we expect some reversal of this ‘embarrassment
of riches’.
Notes
1. However, Conley and Gifford (2006) apply this logic in a largely cross-
sectional empirical context.
2. However, Kohl (2018a; cf. Van Gunten and Navot 2018) shows that the link
between mortgage debt levels and homeownership is much weaker than
often assumed. Stamsø and Tranøy (2019) and Anderson and Kurzer (2019)
in this issue also show that the welfare–debt trade-off is not easily supported
by Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands.
3. In addition to the political forces underpinning the ratchet effect, there may
be more mechanical drivers, such as the maturation of pension schemes and
the incremental nature of many reforms. We are indebted to an anonymous
reviewer for this point.
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4. This pattern is also likely consistent with former socialist countries; we do not
examine these countries here due to the many complications introduced.
5. During the recent housing boom, there is more evidence that these features
contributed to rising housing prices, exacerbating the debt burdens
of homeowners.
6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this hypothesis, as well as
the income and life expectancy hypotheses introduced below.
7. We matched the old (OECD 1985) and the new (OECD 2018) pension
expenditure per GDP series by linking the older ‘pension’ with the newer
‘old age’ category. We took ‘public and mandatory’ expenditure for the
newer series, excluding ‘private voluntary’ spending. The two series show a
discontinuity in levels in 1980. We corrected for this by using the
overlapping years to estimate the post-1980 series using the pre-1980 data,
and then predict values consistent with post-1980 series.
8. We exclude capital account openness from our models because inclusion
restricts the sample period, and because Ansell (2014) does not report
significant relationships with pension spending or replacement rates.
9. Taken from Dryzek and Goodin (1986).
10. Although space precludes a full discussion, we doubt that the assumptions
of these models are appropriate to slow-moving, slow-adjusting variables
such as homeownership and pension benefits ratios.
11. We do not simultaneously estimate random slopes for both country and
decade to avoid over-fitting. Attempting to fit random slopes by year results
in convergence problems (because only 20 observations are available per
year), requiring aggregation to the decade level.
12. In some decades, either the bivariate or base model coefficient is only
significant at a 0.1 threshold. However, controlling for debt, the 95%
confidence interval excludes zero in the 1960s and 1970s.
13. Pension spending results suggest that Ireland, Austria, Denmark,
Luxembourg and Greece – all of which show no discernible relationship in
the replacement rate analysis – experienced a trade-off. At the other end,
Iceland (not included in the replacement rate analysis), Finland and Sweden
show evidence of complementarity in terms of pension spending. Finland is
an anomalous case insofar as replacement rate data (tentatively) suggest a
trade-off, whereas pension spending data suggest complementarity. The
United States is extremely unusual in that controlling for the variables in
our base model inverts the sign (negative in the bivariate model, positive
after controls). US pension spending was highly stable over this period, so
this instability may reflect the lack of a clear relationship.
14. The negative relationship between pensions and mortgage debt suggests the
possibility of a trade-off between mortgage debt (in addition to or rather
than homeownership) and social policy (Prasad 2012). However, we strongly
suspect that such an analysis requires treating policy as the causal variable
(as Prasad does), requiring an analytical framework that does beyond the
scope of this paper.
15. After analysing the relationship between country slopes and public and
private debt separately, we decided to pool both forms of debt in Figure 5.
This results in a better fit, suggesting that different forms of debt may be
substitutes.
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